Political parties in the Senate are almost as polarized at they are in the House. Nevertheless, the explanations for party polarization work better for the House than they do the Senate. The growing polarization literature has speculated, though not precisely measured, the direct influence House polarization has had on the Senate. This paper finds that almost the entire growth in Senate party polarization since the early 1970s can be accounted for by Republican senators who previously served in the House after 1978. In turn, our analysis indicates that the impact of these Republican former representatives can largely be accounted for by a set of constituency factors that are related to increased conservative voting.
First, popular especially among the political pundits and politicians, the purposive creation of safe districts through redistricting has lead ideologically purer districts to elect more conservative Republicans and more liberal Democrats (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, and Rohde 2007 and Hirsch 2005 ; though see McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006 for the counter argument). With fixed state borders, the Senate is immune to the manipulation of constituencies that may cause House party polarization. Second, several scholars suggest that voters have geographically segregated themselves quite independent of district-boundary manipulation (Oppenheimer 2005) . Voters can more easily move across House district lines than state borders to live by their political soul mates. A third set of scholars thinks that the evolving legislative process exacerbates the divide between the parties (Roberts and Smith 2003 and Theriault 2008) . Unlike the House of Representatives where the majority party leaders can more easily manipulate floor proceedings, the more egalitarian Senate requires that much of its work be accomplished through unanimous consent agreements. 3 Because of these theories of polarization, most studies focus almost exclusively on the House (see, for example, Jacobson 2000; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Sinclair 2006; and Mann and Ornstein 2006) . 3 Because of the use of Unanimous Consent Agreements, the Senate has the potential to cast many more divisive amendment votes, which would increase members' polarization scores. As opposed to the House where a mere majority can close down debate, the hurdle for doing so in the Senate is far greater. Manipulation of the legislative process, so it seems, can cut both ways. In the House, divisive procedural votes can cutoff debate, whereas in the Senate, divisive amendments are difficult to restrict. Of course the differences in agenda control could have the opposite effect: the Senate's freer amendment environment could produce a greater number of amendments supported by only a small minority, which would be less polarizing. This is a matter for further empirical research.
A number of new explanations for Senate party polarization have recently been published. Lee (2008) finds that the increased proportion of votes on divisive matters helps explain why the Senate has become more polarized. Theriault (2008) shows that, like the House, the Senate has increasingly become procedurally paralyzed. More votes on the increasingly divisive motions to table amendments and to invoke cloture have increasingly driven Democrats to vote differently than Republicans.
This paper answers the polarization literature puzzle without directly testing or contradicting the more recent findings specific to Senate party polarization. It finds that the growing divide between the voting scores of Democrats and Republicans in the Senate can be 
former House members, and (3) elected to the House after 1978. These traits are not additive. If a senators has one -or even two -of these traits, she is no more likely to be systematically more polarizing than her colleagues. It is the combination that systematically increases a senator's polarizing tendencies. to put a spotlight on Speaker Gingrich, rather it is a short-handed way of saying "Republicans who served in the House after 1978 and who were subsequently elected to the Senate."
If it is true that former representatives who had entered the House after Gingrich account for the lion's share of the Senate's polarization, the next natural question is "why?"
Below we will discuss a number of possible explanations, and then focus our attention mainly on one: the nature of the constituencies that produced those senators. Congress (1973 Congress ( -2006 . Third, we conduct analyses to determine whether the Gingrich Senator effect can be explained by constituency factors. We find that when considered individually, each of the constituency measures we employ has a significant impact on senators' conservatism, but in each case the Gingrich effect also remains significant. When, however, the constituency factors are taken together, they account for much of the polarizing effect of Gingrich senators. Finally, we end our discussion by considering additional factors that we intend to explore in future work. Congress (1973 Congress ( -2004 .
I. Comparing Senate Polarization to House Polarization
5 "Polarization scores" are a common metric for measure polarization between Democrats and
Republicans. Republican polarization scores are simply equal to DW-NOMINATE. Democratic polarization scores are the inverse of DW-NOMINATE. As such, both vary on a scale of roughly 0
Reconstruction time period, the correlation between House polarization and Senate polarization is 0.901 (p<0.01). Additionally, the House has polarized roughly the same as the Senate from its low point to its high point. 6 Both House and Senate polarization may have grown as a result of the contentiousness of the Washington environment, the gamespersonship between the political parties, and the discourse of American politics in the electorate.
The potential problem with these data is that they assume that the process is used to generate the House data is the same as the process generating the Senate data. As votes that their respective members take. As a consequence, Poole and Rosenthal (1996) strictly warn against comparing their DW-NOMINATE scores across chambers. chambers cannot be completed through floor action, the bill goes to a conference committee.
When a majority of both chambers' conferees agree on the bill's provisions, the bill faces the same up or down vote in the House and Senate. At this point (normally), representatives in both chamber are restricted from offering any amendments to the conference committee report. Because the votes are still nonetheless part of the legislative process, a determined opposition may still try to thwart the conference committee's compromise.
The second vote that is identical in both chambers is an attempt to override a presidential veto. As with votes to adopt the conference committee reports, both chambers vote on exactly the same legislative maneuver covering exactly the same piece of legislation (usually around the same date). By their very nature, these votes are different from the other votes taken on the chambers' floors. Nonetheless, a comparison of the party difference scores on these two types of votes provides a window into seeing if party polarization in both chambers is truly equivalent (or nearly so).
On the most important legislation from the 93 rd to the 108 th Congress (1973 Congress ( -2004 figure 1) . Consequently, the House's party difference score on these common votes was 0.02 greater than the Senate's party difference 7 The list of important legislation is a combination of Mayhew's (1991 Mayhew's ( , 2005 list of major enactments and Edwards et al. 's (1997, 2000) list of major failures.
8 Party difference scores are simply the absolute difference between the percentage of Democrats that vote "aye" and the percentage of Republicans that vote "aye."
score. On this measure, the House is 6.3 percent more polarized than the Senate. 9 Although the congress-to-congress chamber differences fluctuates between 0.3 and 16.6 percent, the scores over the entire time period are highly correlated (0.91; statistically significant at the 0.001 level).
Insert Figure 1 The great fluctuation in party difference scores across the congresses in figure 1 suggests that these votes are not typical of all votes. The votes common across both chambers in the 103 rd Congress (1993-4) appear to be more divisive than the common votes in the 107 th Congress (2001-2) . Nonetheless, the small difference between how senators voted and how representatives voted suggests that members in both chambers responded similarly when taking the same action on the same piece of legislation.
The second test uses Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal's common space estimates for member ideology to evaluate the polarization of the parties in their respective chambers (Poole 1998) . These scores are generated in part by holding members common to both 
II. The Effect of House Experience on Senator Ideology
The Senate has prided itself on not being the House. Collegiality, deference, and civility have long characterized the Senate (Matthews 1960) . Perhaps because of these folkways, the Senate considers itself the greatest deliberative body in the world. Insert Figure 6 .
Another cut at the same data presented in figure 6 shows how clearly the Gingrich Senators have polarized the Senate. Not only did no Gingrich Senators serve in the first six congresses of the figure, but also the total party polarization from the 93 rd to the 98 th (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) Burnham (1970) , Brady and Lynn (1973) , Ginsberg (1973 Ginsberg ( , 1976 , Brady (1978 Brady ( , 1991 , Bond and Fleisher (2004) attribute changes in Congress to the replacement of members. On the other hand, Asher and Weisberg (1978, 393-4) , Brady and Sinclair (1984) , Burstein (1978 Burstein ( , 1980 , and Jones Senators were more polarizing than the members they replaced. On average, each switch to a Gingrich Senator led to an increase of 0.162 in the polarization score for that Senate seat.
The increase in polarization was especially great when the Gingrich Senator took over from a Democrat (0.239). Only 7 Gingrich Senators have completed their Senate service. When they left the Senate, their seat become, once again, more moderate (0.086), though losing only about half the polarizing increase that they brought to the Senate.
To confirm the uniqueness of the Gingrich senators and to set the stage for explanations of their impact, we create a baseline multivariate regression model. The dependent variable in this analysis is the senators' first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score.
We include 9 independent variables, though most of them are to develop the triple interaction necessary for isolating the Gingrich effect. To accomplish that, we include indicator variables for senators enter the chamber after the 98 th Congress, for Republican senators, and for former House members. The triple interaction of these indicator variables isolates the Gingrich effect. To get a true read on the triple interaction, we also include the three double interactions. As a control variable to account for the increasing polarization in the Senate, we include a time trend, and to account for the panel nature of the dataset, we include senator random effects. The overall regression performs well (see table 1 ). The R 2 is 0.780, and 7 of the 9 independent variables are statistically significant.
Insert Table 1 .
The baseline multivariate analysis indicates that the "Gingrich effect" is largely a one-party phenomenon. The predicted DW-NOMINATE score for a non-House Republican (1974) find small, but pervasive, member conversions lead to change. Asher and Weisberg (1978) , Sinclair (1977 Sinclair ( , 1982 , Brady and Sinclair (1984) , and Theriault (2006) 
18
The states' partisanship has a large effect on senators' voting behavior (see table 2 , column 1). Taking a Gingrich Senator in a Democratic state (with a -0.09 RPVA) and placing her in a safe Republican state (with a 0.13 RPVA) increases her DW-NOMINATE from 0.57 to 0.63 (a percentage increase of 11 percent). 19 The Gingrich effect, however, is still independently significant, it's value is virtually unchanged from the baseline model, and it is more than three times as great as the constituency effect. Thus state partisanship alone does not account for the Gingrich effect.
Insert Table 2 .
An alternative measure of the nature of constituencies is region. There is wide agreement that the change in party alignment of the southern states has had a strong impact on the ideological orientation of the Republican party in Congress (see, e.g., Black and Black 2002) . It could be that the Gingrich effect is due solely to the increase in Republican control 18 We average the elections across the decade to smooth out the effect of state and region specific outcomes. Using the straight normalized vote (without averaging across the decade) does not change the results at all.
of House and Senate seats in the South, and the more conservative ideological orientation of that region's Republicans. Column 2 of table 2 presents the data related to this possibility.
The impact of region is captured by a dummy variable for the South, and an interaction between region and party. The results show that, as with partisanship, these constituency indicators are both significant, and have a substantial impact. 20 But here too the Gingrich effect also remains significant. Yet in this instance the magnitude of that effect is substantially reduced from the baseline model. Thus the constituency indicators here do seem to account for part of the Gingrich effect, but some of that effect is still present independently.
A third aspect of constituencies that might be important in our explanation is the size of the state. Previous research (Rohde 1979) indicates that representatives in small states are more likely to seek and secure Senate nominations than representatives in large states.
Furthermore, the primary and general-election constituencies in large states are likely to be more heterogeneous than those in small states, creating opportunities for more moderate
Republicans to secure nominations. Thus the Gingrich effect could be due to smaller states being more likely to nominate very conservative GOP representatives. To capture this effect we introduce a variable for the state's population. The results in column 3 of table 2 confirm that this constituency measure also has a significant impact. Yet like the other measures, the Gingrich effect is still present, and its magnitude is closer to that of the baseline model than it was in the model using region. 
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we established that polarization in the Senate has been comparable to that in the House. Then we demonstrated that the Senate's increased polarization was mostly due to the impact of former representatives who had entered the House after the first election of Newt Gingrich in 1978, a group we termed Gingrich Senators. Then we conducted regression analyses to determine whether the Gingrich effect was the consequence of constituency factors. We showed that each of the constituency measures we employ has a significant impact on senators' conservatism when considered individually. Moreover, when the constituency factors were included together, they accounted for much of the polarizing effect of Gingrich Senators.
While we believe that the current analysis makes a consequential contribution to Finally, we remind the reader that while the Gingrich effect was no longer statistically significant when we controlled for all of our constituency measures, it was still positive and substantial. It may be that further analysis along the lines we have outlined may still reveal a significant independent effect from House service by Republicans.
Thus there is still a considerable amount of work to be done. Despite that fact, however, we think this paper's isolation of the effect of Gingrich senators on Senate polarization, and its explanations for that effect, have made a substantial contribution to our understanding of ideological polarization in the Senate. 1   93rd  94th  95th  96th  97th  98th  99th  100th  101st  102nd  103rd  104th  105th  106th  107th  108th  109th Party Polarization 
